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INTRODUCTION 
“If the conditions were right, there could be great acceptance. Often it is only when they 
pose an economic or political threat that it turns really ugly.” 
-Iris Chang 
Anti-immigrant sentiment is rampant in French politics and media. While living in 
France, every time I turned on the television to a news station, I heard at least one report of 
an attack by immigrants or a politician denouncing immigrants, an announcement of a new 
law or policy against immigrants. I then heard a round of arguments or comments along the 
lines of, “They are stealing our jobs and taking advantage of our government,” “Government 
aid should be used for French people,” and “There are homeless French people but they give 
housing to immigrants first” from those who were watching the news with me.  
Since I have an interest in coming to France to study at a graduate level and work 
there after finishing my education, I asked my news watching partners how I would be 
received in France were I to do these things. After all, I would be stealing a job from native 
French person and accepting government aid in terms of CAF (Caisses d’Allocations 
Familiales), which is a sum of money that is allocated to students by the French government 
to help pay for student accommodations with the amount depending on the type of 
accommodation and your income. These are all things my fellow news watchers claimed 
made them dislike immigrants. I was immediately reassured that I would be welcomed in 
France. When I pointed out that I would be an immigrant, they dismissed it saying I was 
okay because I was learning the language and wanted to work and contribute to French 
society. These opposing reactions to the same subject piqued my interest into French 
acceptance of immigrants, which lead me to ask the question: What are the legal, social, and 
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economic barriers to acceptance of immigrants in France? This question is important and 
worth being studied because of the recent immigrant crises in Europe and the fact that the 
majority of the immigrants in question pass through France or end up settling there. Between 
2015 and 2016, 12.3% of France’s population was foreign born and 1 million people applied 
for asylum in Europe, which is sure to result in a rise of the foreign-born population in all 
European nations (Connor et al). Many illegal immigrants also work their way through 
Europe and France in hopes of reaching nations such as Germany or Britain but end up 
detained in camps.  
In order to fully comprehend why current immigrants face the legal, social, and 
economic barriers they do, it is important to have a base knowledge of the historic attitudes 
and policies of France towards immigrants since the times of the French colonial empire. 
During the times of the French colonial empire, the dominant ideology in Europe said that 
the superior races, that is to say the Europeans, were obligated to civilize the inferior races, 
that is to say non-white, non- Europeans. Additionally, those conquered by the French were 
required to assimilate into French culture. They were legally required to renounce their 
culture and espouse the values of the universal republic (Révision du bac). These ideologies 
set standards for the centuries to come on who can be considered truly French and how they 
should comport themselves. During the French Revolution, a clear distinction was set 
between French citizens and foreigners: To be a French citizen, one must have been born in 
France with French parents. This idea of exclusive citizenship prevailed for a short while and 
then died.  
During the 1800s, the need for workers dramatically increased due to 
Industrialization. Many immigrants came to France during this time and did the work that 
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French natives would not do and for much less money. It is estimated that 100,000 foreigners 
were present in 1800, 380,000 in 1851 and one million in 1886 (Collectif des luttins). 
However, between 1825 and 1848 and 1866 to 1896, recessions affected laborers. 
Unemployment exploded and so did xenophobia. Throughout France there were 
demonstrations against immigrants who were accused of taking jobs from the French and 
lowering wages by accepting lower pay. Immigrants had to register at city halls and get 
registration numbers. Violence was rampant.  During the 1870s, train loads of Italians were 
sent back to Italy. The Italian language, way of dress, and religion all publicly marked them 
as immigrants and targets during this time (Collectif des luttins). The idea of who is French 
and who is not changed with the loi de 1889, which it declared that a child is French if it is 
born in France and at least one of their parents was also born in France. For those children 
born of two foreign parents, the child could accept or denounce French nationality once they 
reached the majority.  
In April 1917, perhaps due to the influx of colonial soldiers, the “carte d’identité 
d’étranger” was introduced. It was the first time in Europe that identification was aimed at all 
foreigners, and it marked a fundamental stage in the history of immigration controls in 
France (La documentation Française : La librairie du citoyen). It was also when usage of the 
term “immigré” took the place of “étranger” and was used to describe foreign workers until 
the middle of the 20th century to describe labor immigrants. World War I mobilized eight 
million French people. By 1918, 1.4 million were dead and three million were wounded 
(Collectif des luttins). The birth rate also dropped significantly from 604,000 births in 1813 
to 313,000 births in 1916 (Collectif des luttins). Immigrants were needed to replace the 
working population of France.  
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During World War I troops were recruited from the French colonies and told if they 
fought for France, their status would improve. Many soldiers came from the colonies and 
promptly died as they were used as throw away troops in battles (Révision du bac). After the 
war, those troops who survived found their military service swiftly overshadowed by newly 
developed racist stereotypes. There was a special ministry dedicated to sending them back to 
their home country, and the colonial soldiers and workers who came during the war and were 
replaced with Italian and Polish workers. It was the first “immigration choisie” policy of 
France (Gérard). Thus continued the traditional ideas developed during the French Colonial 
Empire of who is truly French - white people born in France, and who is not- anyone who is 
not white and/or born in France. 
After the war came the booming twenties. Reconstruction was needed and Spanish, 
Armenian, and Russian workers, as well as Jews all fleeing persecution, and Algerians who 
came in great numbers were a considered a god-send. The war had re-established the need for 
foreigners to have passports and the French State took charge for the questioning of 
immigrants. In 1929, there was a worldwide economic crisis and 16% of the French working 
population were unemployed by 1935 (Collectif des luttins). As happens when there are not 
enough jobs, xenophobia rose rapidly. Many unemployed immigrants were sent back to their 
native countries. During the Second World War the Vichy regime relied on xenophobia to 
push through policies of denaturalization of immigrants and undesirable foreigners. In 1942, 
it was decreed that French Jews could also be interred in camps leading to the deaths of 
many.   
After World War II, around 600,000 French citizens were dead, 9,000 bridges, 115 
train stations, 91,000 factories, and 550,000 houses needed to be rebuilt. Immigrants were 
 Chobot 7 
 
once again called upon to help rebuild France (Collectif des luttins). To help re-populate 
France the 1945 Code de la nationalité was instituted which liberalized who was considered 
French and who was not. L’Office National d’Immigration actively recruited immigrants. 
Immigration from French colonies and former colonies increased significantly. 
Decolonization of the French Colonial Empire during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s and the 
resulting influx of people from these colonies moving to France factored heavily into the 
changing face of immigrants. Immigrants were coming from more and more religiously, 
culturally, and linguistically diverse places than ever before. Immigration from the Algeria 
alone was 210,000 in 1945 and reached 711,000 by 1974 (Collectif des luttins). What 
followed is called the Thirty Glorious Years, an economic boom. However, in the early 
1970s, a new economic crisis occurred and in 1974, the French government decided to close 
the borders with the objective of controlling immigration (Collectif des luttins). Xenophobia, 
once again rose.  
The nomenclature of French citizenship has evolved in the past, to be French one 
must be white and have been born in France with French parents. Now to be French one can 
been born in France with immigrant parents. Before World War I immigrants were referred 
to as “étrangers” or foreigners. The ends of World War I and World War II brought 
acceptance of naturalized immigrants, and the use of the word “immigré,” immigrant, instead 
of foreigner. More recently the 1991 High Conseil of Integration (INSEE) defined an 
immigrant as “personne née étrangère à l’étranger et résidant en France,” a person born 
abroad and a resident in France (La documentation Française : La librairie du citoyen). This 
definition means that even if a person becomes French, he or she will always be considered 
an immigrant, thus the terms “immigrés devenus français,” immigrant become French, and 
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“immigrés étrangers,” foreigner immigrant. To the native French population, it would seem, 
a naturalized citizen will never truly be French. The title of immigrant will precede a 
naturalized citizen wherever they go and whatever they do.  Because of the restriction of 
immigrant workers in the 1970s most immigration to France is now family reunification 
rather than economic. Immigration of “séjour délivrés” or non-economic immigration 
reached 210,000 in 2014, while only 20,000 immigrants with economic motives came to 
France (La documentation Française : La librairie du citoyen). Many of these immigrants to 
France now come from countries that are culturally, religiously, and linguistically very 
different from France. There is still the push for immigrants to assimilate but many French 
natives fear that it is impossible for these new immigrants to assimilate, because their culture, 
values, and mode of life are too different from the native French populations. Barriers to 
acceptance of immigrants by the French population have risen in modern legal, social, and 
economic forms and will be examined in this thesis.  
Chapter one will discuss and analyze the legal and social barriers immigrants face as 
they arrive in France and attempt to enter French society. I will begin the chapter analyzing 
the legal requirements for immigrants to become French citizens. After examining this, an 
initial conclusion will be drawn on what it takes to be accepted by France. I will then analyze 
French ideas about citizenship and culture to establish what is socially expected of an 
immigrant as they attempt to become French. Next I will explain what communautarisme is 
and the growing discord between communautarisme and nationalism, as well as how outward 
expressions of religion do not fit in French social life. At this point, readers should 
understand French social expectations of immigrants and how these expectations can be 
barriers to acceptance into French society. 
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Chapter two analyses immigrant integration into the French labor market and 
economy. I will begin the chapter by explaining the factors that shape labor market outcomes 
for immigrants in France and how these factors affect employment levels and earnings - both 
signs of economic integration - of different sets of immigrant groups. I will then discuss 
specific examples to demonstrate how religion can affect an immigrant group’s economic 
integration ability. Long term labor market outcomes for immigrant groups will also be 
examined as I look into the outcomes of the second generation of immigrants. Readers 
should have an understanding of the different barriers immigrants face as they attempt to 
integrate into the French economy and how success or failure of each immigrant group can 
influence how each group is received by the native French population by the end of this 
chapter.  
Xenophobia is on the rise in France due to the numerous economic crises that have 
affected the EU in the last decade. French attitudes and laws have historically required an 
immigrant assimilate to everything French, including the culture, religion, and language. 
With so many immigrants now coming from regions that are completely different in these 
aspects it is becoming harder and harder for the French to tolerate them. History is repeating 
itself but the immigrants now coming to France are unlike any of the European immigrants 
that came before them. It will be interesting to see how these newer immigrants integrate into 
French society and if France can change its expectations of assimilation in order to accept a 
population that does not wish to fully adopt the French way of life.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Citizenship in France  
“We must force the government to stop the bird migration. We must shoot all birds, field all 
out men and troops…and force migratory birds to stay where they are.” 
- Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
This chapter will examine what it takes to become a citizen legally as well as what it 
takes to be considered a French person by the native French population. Rapid changes in 
society, such as this current massive wave of immigrants, make people feel like their safe and 
familiar surroundings are disappearing, which can result in hostile attitudes towards those 
who are making it disappear, in this case, immigrants. It can also engender resentment of 
everything that is unknown and unfamiliar (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 6). Rapid 
changes, such as the current immigrant crisis, can often bring about extreme ideas of 
assimilation so as to ensure cultural norms of the host country and often revive “us vs. them” 
attitudes. As such, ideas like “they have to integrate into our society,” “adapt to our culture,” 
or “learn our language” become prevalent (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 7). For the French, 
multiculturalism or “communautarisme” is a negative word and immigrants will only ever 
really be accepted into French society if they can outwardly comport themselves in the 
manner of native French citizens and are not a part of a visible minority. That is to say they 
are not to outwardly different from the “average” French citizen. Finally, nationalism is 
rising as France is inundated with crisis after crisis and Muslims, as a visible minority, 
become less and less able to assimilate into French society and more and more of a target.  
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Legal Barriers to Acceptance of Immigrants in France: 
To assess the barriers to acceptance that immigrants face in France, analysis will start 
at the beginning of the acceptance process by looking at what legal barriers an immigrant 
must tackle to become a French citizen. There are four ways an immigrant can become a 
French citizen:  
1.) Le droit du sang, one who has a parent who is a French citizen.  
2.) Le droit du sol, one was born on French soil.  
3.) Naturalization  
4.) Marriage 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will only be examining the legal process of naturalization to 
obtain French citizenship. 
 On the public service website verified by the French government, there is a detailed 
list of the seven main requirements that any potential citizen needs to fulfill before being 
considered for citizenship. There is also a warning that even if all the conditions are meant, it 
is still possible that the administration can refuse the application of the potential citizen 
(Republic Française). 
 The first four requirements for immigrants to become French citizens are either 
technical or have to do with quality of character. An immigrant who wishes to become 
French must be at least eighteen years of age. Eighteen is the legal age of adulthood and 
when, technically, a person should be able to support his or her self. They must also decide 
which nationalities to keep and which ones to renounce. That is to say, if an immigrant 
legally can and wishes to be both French and another nationality, they must declare this. In 
terms of quality of character and economic self-sufficiency, an immigrant must demonstrate 
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that they will have stable and sufficient resources to live on while in France and must be in 
possession of morality, judged by the timely payment of taxes and lack criminal charges. 
Although it is not a requirement that the immigrant in question have a job, it is preferable. 
The assessment of an immigrant’s possession of morality and lack of criminal charges will be 
evaluated by the administrative center and will review the applicant’s civic comportment, 
mostly manifesting in the payment of taxes. An applicant must also not have been convicted 
of crimes of terrorism nor have been incarcerated for more than six months without reprieve 
(Republic Française). These requirements demonstrate the overall desire of the French 
government that immigrants not be a societal and economic strain on their new country but 
an asset instead.  
The last three conditions to become a French citizen requires a willingness to 
assimilate. These three conditions entail living in France for a specified amount of time, 
living in France from the moment the naturalization papers are signed, and proof of 
assimilation into the French community. Insistence that immigrants be assimilated can be 
seen in the exceptions that reduce the time an immigrant is required to live in France before 
applying for citizenship and the notion behind the requirement that insists that an immigrant 
live in France from the moment the naturalization papers are signed.  
The amount of time an immigrant has to spend in France before he or she can apply 
for citizenship is typically five years, but there are three main exceptions where the duration 
of residence can be reduced to two years. The first entails successfully completing two years 
of studies in the process of obtaining a diploma at a French school. The second requires a 
personal contribution to the “rayonnement” or prestige of France (Republic Française). The 
third allows a two-year duration of residence if one can present proof of exceptional 
 Chobot 13 
 
integration, which can include accomplished actions in the realms of civics, the sciences, 
economics, culture, or sports. This differs from the second exception because the action is on 
the part of the individual rather than on the part of France. An immigrant can also be 
exempted from this particular requirement if they serve in the French armed forces, provided 
exceptional services to France, are a refugee, or if the French language is their native 
language and they have had five years of formal education in a French speaking school, in a 
country where the official language is French.  
Upon naturalization, an immigrant’s working and family life must be based in France. 
The requirement that an immigrant must live in France from the moment of naturalization 
comes from the idea that “La notion de résidence est plus large que la notion habituelle de 
domicile. Elle implique que vous devez avoir en France le centre de vos intérêts matériels 
(notamment professionnels) et de vos liens familiaux” or “The notion of residence is larger 
than the notion of habituel domicile. It implies that you must have, in France, the center of 
your material interests (notably professional) and your family ties” (Republic Française). 
There is also a warning that if an immigrant’s spouse and children live in a different country, 
one’s application for French citizenship can be refused. This warning highlights just how 
serious the French government is when it says that the immigrant’s life must be uprooted and 
replanted in France.  
Reductions and exceptions in the duration of the residence requirement indicate that 
France favors citizens that are well-educated, will serve France, and who speak the French 
language. The requirement that new citizens must live in France and the expectation that they 
will give up one’s family and working life in one’s old country indicate the level of roots 
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these new citizens are expected to put down in France. They are fully expected to 
disassociate from their country of birth and have primarily French work and family ties. 
Assimilation into the French community is a two-pronged requirement and begins 
with knowledge of the French language. Learning the host country’s language is the first part 
of the assimilation process. The “Language Requirements for Adult Migrants in Council of 
Europe Member States: Report on a Survey” indicates that France requires language 
knowledge to gain admission to the host country, obtain permanent residency, and to acquire 
citizenship (Extramiana and Van Avermaet 9). The required language level for entrance into 
France is A1.1, and for permanent residency it is also A1.1, which are very low levels. 
However, for citizenship an immigrant is required to conduct and pass an interview in French 
(Extramiana and Van Avermaet 18). Exceptions of this rule are given to immigrants older 
than sixty and those suffering a handicap or having deficient health. An immigrant can be 
exempt from this rule if they are a refuge, a regular and habitual resident in France from the 
age of fifteen onward, or older than seventy years of age (Republic Française). 
The second part of the assimilation requirement is a proof of knowledge of the values 
of the Republic of France, which will be given in an interview at the consulate. One must 
demonstrate an attachment to these principles and values, as well as a sufficient knowledge 
of the history, culture, and society of France in the form of a citizenship test. It is also 
required that the immigrant sign the Charter of Rights and Obligations of a French Citizen at 
the consulate (Republic Française). 
Requirements of assimilation by way of speaking the French language, knowledge of 
the values of the Republic, demonstration of attachment to these principles and values, and 
knowledge of French history, culture, and society all demonstrate the French government’s 
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desire that new citizens become socially French and leave their native country’s habits, 
culture, and language behind.  
Legally it appears to be relatively easy to become a French citizen. The wait time to 
apply to become a citizen is reasonable, as is the language requirement, which is beneficial to 
the new citizen, in that it allows them a greater access to parts of their new country. The 
expectation that the new citizen lives in France after obtaining citizenship and the 
requirements of being of good moral value and lacking a criminal record are also reasonable 
in that the government wishes its citizens to contribute to rather than be a strain on France. 
Upon closer examination three out of seven of these requirements -duration of 
residence beforehand, place of domicile after citizenship, and proof of assimilation- require 
that the immigrant wanting to become a citizen is already somewhat assimilated into French 
society, while just two out of seven -age of and nationalities of immigrant- deal with 
technicalities and two out of seven -able to survive economically and lack of morality and 
criminal charges-  requires a demonstration of quality of character and economic self-
sufficiency. Only one of the three requirements for assimilation specifically mentions the 
word assimilation and that is the one that requires knowledge of the French language and the 
values of the Republic, demonstration of attachment to those values, and knowledge of 
French history, culture and society. However, assimilation expectations can be found in the 
lessening of the duration of residence. Most significantly, is the requirement that the citizen 
in question must live in France form the moment that the naturalization papers are signed. 
This seems reasonable but if we consider the notion behind this requirement, the idea that 
family and material interests should rest centrally in France, this requirement has the 
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intention of assimilation. A new citizen is supposed to give up their family life and work 
contacts in their old country and completely redevelop these ties in France. 
 
Citizenship and Nationalism vs. Culture and Communautraisme 
Legally speaking it is easy to become a French citizen, to gain social acceptance is 
less so. In “Theoretical Inquiries in Law: The Culture of Citizenship”, Leti Volpp examines 
the relationship between culture and citizenship. Volpp says  
Citizenship is both a cultural and anti-cultural institution, by which I mean that 
citizenship positions itself as oppositional to specific cultures, even as it is constituted 
by quite specific cultural values. The citizen is assumed to be modern and motivated 
by reason; the cultural other is assumed to be traditional and motivate by culture. In 
order to be assimilated into citizenship, the cultural other needs to shed his excessive 
and archaic culture. (574) 
Citizenship is both cultural and anti-cultural in the case of France. To put this into context, let 
us look at loi n° 2004-228 instituted in 2004 which bans conspicuous religious symbols in 
government funded schools (Adida et al. 1). Loi n° 2004-228 is more popularly known as the 
headscarf ban, because it was primarily introduced to put a stop to Muslim girls wearing 
headscarves in school. The headscarf is an outward symbol of “opposition” to French culture, 
therefore, it was not to be tolerated so as to protect French Republicanism. In 2003, the 
President of France, Jacques Chirac, convened the Stasi Commission to examine how the 
French principal of laicité (secularity) should be practiced (Volpp 572). The idea of strict 
separation of church and state has been around since the French Revolution, and it is believed 
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that this separation fosters French republicanism. So, to uphold this pillar of the French 
Republic and to further homogenize immigrants in France, the ban was implemented.  
Interestingly, Chirac said that the ban “protects our schools from breaking down 
along ethnic lines” (Volpp 573). Why did he use the word ethnic and not religious, when the 
law dealt with a religious matter? This word play allows us to see what else is at work behind 
this law, because the state view on Muslim religious practices is joined with concerns over 
ethnic differences, culture and religion become one consideration. The force behind this 
debate over headscarves in the school is, in fact, a reflection of the desire to see the greater 
Muslim community more visibly assimilated into French culture (Volpp 574). Thus, we can 
see how a cultural other, a visible minority, is perceived as a threat to the culture of French 
citizenship and France’s attempts at eradicating the perceived threat to Republicanism.   
The idea expressed by Volpp can be described by the French term: 
communautarisme. Le Petit Robert dictionary was the first to define communautarisme in 
1993 as “a system that develops a formation of communities (ethnic, religious, cultural, 
social) that can divide the nation to the detriment of integration (qtd. in Montague 220). 
Powerful emotional reactions are evoked by the idea of communautarisme. It is now a term 
that is used to primarily to warn against perceived intents of minority groups to create 
distinct communities and make specific racial or ethnic demands that are considered to 
violate Republican norms. This is because the French Constitution proclaims that the French 
Republic only recognizes equal citizens, “without distinction of origin, race, or religion” 
promoting the ideas of colorblindness and universalism. However, the French connect the 
idea of being a racial minority with not being French, or being an immigrant. This is where 
the expressions of “second generation” or “of immigrant descent” comes from, and racial 
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minorities are viewed as the “foreigners from within” regardless of their citizenship status 
(des Nieges Léonard 83,). Anti-communautraisme discourse asserts that recognizing group 
demands for equality would fracture the Republican community and create discord within the 
nation itself (Montague 220). Anti-communautraisme is seen to represent the principles of 
French Republicanism and is considered rational, while communautraisme is seen to 
represent the undemocratic and irrational. This system puts minorities in a difficult situation. 
They suffer from discrimination because they are minorities but because of anti-
communautraisme they cannot demand legal protections based on their minority status or 
even promote cultural pride because to do so would promote communautraisme. This leaves 
minorities with the option of eliminating their differences from the native French population, 
which involves rejecting things they value and is often impossible.  
 In the past, colonial domination in general, and slavery in particular, was related to skin 
color. Whether an immigrant is a French citizen, if they have a different skin color they will 
never be seen as such (Des Nieges Léonard, 77). If their skin color is not white, they must 
come from somewhere else, which makes them a de facto immigrant.  Race is said not to be 
taken into account in the French constitution and there is still not information collected in the 
French census. This is intended to promote the idea that all French citizens are the same, 
when, in fact, it does not. “Real” French national identity is white and is demonstrated by the 
fact that no one can be counted differently. An immigrant must not be too outwardly different 
from the native French population to be accepted as truly French. So, citizenship is both 
cultural and anti-cultural. France demands that all immigrants become as outwardly French 
as possible. However, given the institutionalized racism prevalent in France this becomes 
almost impossible for immigrants of visible minorities.  
 Chobot 19 
 
The Grand Debate on National Identity held in 2009 at the behest of then President 
Sarkozy was intended to promote a new collective understanding of what it means to be 
French. The instructions sent out for the debate centered around “the theme of immigration 
and the place of French people of immigrant origin within the national fabric” (Goodliffe 2). 
During the Grand Debate on National Identity, Eric Besson, the Minister of Immigration, 
Integration and National Identity and Cooperative Development re-asserted these ideas by 
starting the debate with a provocative declaration that the French had a set of “shared values” 
most notably, their republicanism, secularism and belief in universal values (Adida et al. 1). 
The Grand Debate almost exclusively focused on immigration and Islam, with the ultimate 
result of giving the impression that Islam is incompatible with the Republic. It also resulted 
in public sentiment that at least a Muslim citizen should always be asked to reaffirm their 
allegiance to the Republic before being proven innocent, thereby assigning them a separate 
identity rather than regarding them first and foremost as a citizen (Goodliffe 6). 
 French identity is restricted to those who are not too culturally different, which reflects 
the existence of a French national identity of religious secularity. The status of truly “French” 
is more connected to membership of a specific historical group. That is to say, possessing a 
French passport does not guarantee being viewed as a citizen, rather than a migrant. 
Citizenship in the state does not constitute citizenship in the nation, which is created through 
notions of kinship and belonging. If an immigrant does not leave their old cultural practices 
behind to fully adopt citizenship practices, he or she will not be seen as French. 
The past decade has seen the European Union go through crises after crises resulting 
in a re-emergence of nationalism. Profound political and social trends are reflected by the 
efforts of each government to defend their national self- interest in the EU and with the rise 
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of rightwing populist nativism (Barber). France’s center-right opposition Republicans are 
well placed to win the 2017 presidential election and the later legislative elections and would 
like to see stricter national border controls, a reduced role for the commission, and more 
national influence over common EU policies, all parts of moderate nationalism (Barber). 
Additionally, radical right-wing populism is rising due to parts of society are not only 
offended by multiculturalism or losing out in a globalized economy, but by liberal values that 
espouse these ideals. The Radical right-wing populist is both Islamophobic and anti-
immigrant and can easily go hand in hand with the protectionist center-right opposition 
Republicans, the most likely 2017 presidential candidate and legislative majority.  
Already there are laws in place or attempting to be put in place that will limit 
immigrant access to French life. One such example is the passage of the March 2017 “clause 
Molière” included in the ironically English named “Small Business Act,” passed in Paris, 
which requires all laborers hired on publicly funded building projects to use French as their 
working language (Huguen).  Similar measures are already in place in Normandy, Hauts-de 
France, and Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes, which like the Paris region are run by the conservative 
Les Républicains party and centrists allies. All of these regions are now considering creating 
special brigades to patrol building sites to check workers’ language skills (Huguen). The 
official reason for this clause is to funnel more business to small French firms, however, 
advocates make no secret that the clause is used to push foreign workers out of construction 
jobs so “real French workers” can take their place.  Philippe Martinez, the head of France’s 
leading CGT union is quoted as finding the clause “regrettable and dangerous” that the 
mainstream right seems to be “following in the footsteps of the National Front” (Hugeun). 
Thus, the French citizenship idea that one should speak exclusively French in public life and 
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anti-communautarisme go hand in hand with the current rise in nationalism to erect social 
barriers to acceptance of immigrants in France.  
 
Attitudes Towards Religion in French Society  
The presidential agenda for defining “Frenchness” in 2009 was broad and continues 
today but the main purpose was to address the concerns of the ability of Europe, in general, 
and France in particular, to assimilate the vast number of Muslim immigrates in a post-World 
War II world of immigration. Muslims in particular are less able to hide their cultural 
differences from the native French population. Additionally, as Muslims immigrate from 
areas such as Africa and the Middle East, they are more and more identified by their skin 
tone, thus becoming an even more visible “visible minority.” A Pew survey shows that 76 
percent of non- Muslim respondents in France expressed concern over Muslim extremism in 
their country, indicating the worry about the implications of a non-assimilating Muslim 
population (Adida et al. 2). The apparent failure to assimilate Muslims in France compared to 
earlier waves of immigrant’s leads the French population to consider Muslim immigrants a 
threat, particularly given recent terrorist attacks. Characteristics that are commonly 
considered factors of assimilation, such as high education and job qualifications, reverse 
integration and thus, religious secularization, among Muslims rather than accelerate it (Adida 
et al. 2). The loyalty of the Muslim immigrants to their adopted country is also questioned 
because of their reluctance to leave their religion in the private sphere and adopt a public 
persona of a loyal French Republican. This results in increased “us” and “them” rhetoric 
when talking about this minority group.  
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As the popular and re-occurring discourse of what is “Frenchness” continues, democratic 
citizenship and the upholding of the values of the Republic are viewed as a solution to the 
problems posed by multiculturalism, because “cultural attachments are thought to inhibit 
one’s ability to engage in several distinct forms of citizenship” (Volpp 577). The headscarf 
debate in France hides the deeper question of the cultural specificity of the French policy of 
secularism. Supposed secularism is one of the foundational pillars of the Republic, however, 
it is a secularism that heavily favors Christianity in that there are numerous Christian 
holidays in the French calendar, the government funds approximately nine hundred private 
Catholic school as opposed to one Muslim one, and chaplains can be found in public school 
staff (Volpp 590).  
The idea of religion as a private practice is arguably a Christian idea as Jewish and 
Islamic religious practices of a social community following visible religious rules. France 
tends to display hostile feelings against Muslim immigrants, partly because European states 
are defined by their historic nationalities, all of them with strong Christian traditions that 
have had a historically bad relationship with the Islamic world going back to the fall of 
Constantinople to the Ottomans. This makes it difficult when the majority of new immigrants 
to Europe and France are Muslim. The idea that to be French, one must be Christian is 
manifested in political parties such as the Front National in France, which have mobilized 
public opinion to fight what a potential Muslim demographic predominance in parts of 
France. Many French cities have tried to use zoning regulations to restrict construction of 
Mosque’s because they fear that it would mean permanent Muslim presence, not realizing 
that Muslims are already in France to stay (qtd. in Volpp 3). The type of secularism claimed 
by France is at best a watery secularism. The headscarf ban serves to preserve the idea of 
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France and “Frenchness” as Christian and anything else as other, under the guise of the 
concept of Republicanism. From this rises the problem of the “eternal migrant” (Volpp 592). 
Where certain citizens, born, raised, and educated in France are treated as second-class 
citizens because they cannot be sent back home nor are they considered truly French.  
 
Conclusion 
It is very easy to become a French citizen legally speaking. An immigrant only has to 
wait five years to apply for citizenship, the language requirement is relatively minimal and 
beneficial to the new citizen, and the requirements of being in possession of good moral 
value and lacking a criminal record, as well, as residing in France after obtaining citizenship 
are reasonable. However, upon closer examination of the stipulations to French citizenship 
the most extensive requirements request proof of and continued assimilation into French 
society. However, as the European Union undergoes continuous economic crises, France has 
seen a resurgence in nationalism which has place protectionist center-right opposition 
Republicans in a prime position to win the 2017 presidential office and legislative majority. 
Center-right opposition Republican ideology goes hand in hand with the newly popular 
radical right-wing populist party which expresses Islamophobic and anti-immigrant ideals. 
Additionally, secularism in the French manner entails rejecting any outward signs of culture, 
religion, and ethnicity in favor of expressing the values of Republicanism. Rising nationalism 
and a historic dislike of any identity marker that is not French makes it incredibly difficult for 
immigrants to gain acceptance in French society.  
Here we see that assimilation is not a linear process. Because assimilation and 
citizenship correspond so strongly it is impossible to talk about citizenship without 
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simultaneously discussing assimilation. Due to this assimilation/citizenship correlation 
gaining citizenship is not a process of leaving something behind but more of why does the 
immigrant want to be French? Why should the French government accept him or her as a 
citizen? An immigrant has have to have a good reason to want to become French. To already 
have a reason as to why the French should accept him or her, as to why he or she wants to 
become French entails a degree of assimilation already occurring. This fact, rising 
nationalism, and a greater attachment to French Republican values raises two questions in 
terms of French social acceptance of immigrants. Are the French requesting assimilation to a 
certain point and when that point is reached the assimilation goal is increased? Or is it a 
matter of immigrants saying they will assimilate but not actually meaning it? Perhaps, it is a 
little of both. There is always a further demand of assimilation: speak our language, work 
like we do, live like we do, worship like we do, become one of us, give up his or her old self 
entirely. This is nearly impossible to do, especially when one is a newly immigrated, but it is 
what the French want. On the other hand, many immigrants might say they will learn the 
French language but then never learn past the required level. They might give lip service to 
certain Republican values but actually dislike certain ones. Required assimilation in so far as 
they must in order to gain legal status already makes it difficult for immigrants to gain 
acceptance into French society. Rising nationalism which results in moving the proverbial 
goal post of assimilation once it is reached makes it that much more difficult. This can also 
lead to many immigrants asking why try, if the goal will only increase once reached.  
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CHPATER TWO: Economic Acceptance 
“Where asylum is used as a route to economic migration, it can cause deep resentment in the 
host community.” 
-David Blunkett 
In this chapter, we will be examining immigrant’s integration into the French labor 
market and economy. Immigrant integration in these areas is important. This is because the 
more successful immigrants are in the labor market, the higher their net economic and fiscal 
contribution to the host economy will be and the more well-received they are by the host 
nation. However, if immigrants have poor economic success, social and economic exclusion 
of immigrants and their descendants may result. This can lead to social unrest by immigrants 
and natives alike. Given this, immigration policy can be affected by immigrant’s ability to 
successfully integrate into the French labor market and economy. 
It is important to look at the factors that shape labor market outcomes – region of 
origin, level of education, reason for migration, gender – as well as the employment levels 
and earnings of different sets of immigrants to see why one group is more accepted by the 
French than another group. Specific examples will also be examined to assess how religion 
can negatively affect an immigrant’s economic integration ability. Finally, long-term labor 
market outcomes for immigrant groups will be examined as we look into the outcomes of the 
second generation.  
 
The First Generation 
France’s labor market is notoriously hostile to new entrants, immigrants and native 
young people seeking their first jobs alike. However, there are many more restrictions put in 
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place to prevent immigrants from obtaining certain jobs. A variety of laws and regulations 
have resulted in restriction of foreign nationals from working in six million jobs, 
approximately one-third of the labor market, including all public-sector jobs, fifty private 
sector careers, such as being a veterinarian or pilot, and self-employed regulated professions, 
such as being a doctor, lawyer, architect or pharmacist (qtd. in Simon and Steichen 2). The 
European Union has forced France to open up certain jobs to European nationals, and in 
professions such as medicine, law, and architecture an immigrant can participate after a 
lengthy and intense examination of credentials (Observatiore des inégalités). These 
restrictions have had a negative effect on immigrant integration into the French labor market. 
For example, a doctor from South Africa has immigrated to France. He cannot practice 
medicine, because his credentials have yet to be approved by the French government. 
Meanwhile, he must support himself and works in a factory. He is underemployed and not 
contributing his maximum economic ability to France. This in turn causes the French natives 
to view him and by extension South African immigrants in a bad light. Now, we take a 
doctor from Hungary. He can practice medicine, because he is a member of the European 
Union. He contributes his maximum economic and fiscal ability to France and as such 
French natives view him and his Hungarian compatriots as beneficial immigrants.  
Employment and earnings are indicative of economic integration and in terms of 
region of origin, European immigrants tended to display the best employment rates while 
North Africans were especially prone to unemployment and sub-Saharan Africans were most 
likely to be employed in the lowest skilled jobs, and both groups of Africans were susceptible 
to unstable work (Simon and Steichen 1). From their date of arrival, European migrants had 
the highest employment rates at forty-six percent employment one year after arrival, 
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compared to less than thirty percent for other migrant groups (Simon and Steichen 10). 
Employment rates increased for groups of all origins with time, but non- European migrants 
did not catch up with European migrants. In fact, the gap between European migrant and 
non-European migrant employment increased, because nine years after arrival the 
employment rates were seventy-nine percent and fifty-five percent respectively (Simon and 
Steichen 10). Of all origin groups, North African migrants are especially prone to 
unemployment, and both groups of Africans had lower employment rates than other migrants 
and natives. This has led to easier acceptance of European immigrants by French natives and 
general rejection of African immigrants. As will be discussed later discrimination also leads 
to lower employment for this group and thus an endless spiral of economic exclusion occurs.  
Earnings are the second indicator of economic integration. “The Economic Situation of First 
and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom” used 
simple earning functions that were estimated separately for men and women to identify gaps 
in earnings. Log net hourly wages is the dependent variable and a basic set of characteristics 
including experience and education, for which both acquired in the country of origin and the 
destination country were controlled. This analysis also uses groups labeled as immigrants 
from Africa, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Turkey, Maghreb, and 
Asia. There were only three groups of men that earn significantly less than comparable native 
men. These are immigrants from Africa who earn 0.262 log points less, immigrants form the 
Maghreb who earn 0.161 log points less, and immigrants from Turkey who earn 0.099 log 
points less (Algan et al. F19). This indicates difficulty in economic integration for men from 
Africa, the Maghreb and Turkey. 
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(Algan et al. F17). 
For women, the overall earnings pattern is similar to men except that now Eastern 
European women do poorly at 0.164 log points less than native women while Turkish women 
did relatively well at .072 log points less than native women. This is interesting given how, 
overall, this immigrant group earns much less than comparable French natives. Maghreb and 
African women earn 0.089 and 0.227 log points less than comparable native women 
respectively. All first-generation immigrant groups earn at least 0.13 log points less than 
comparable, native, French citizens, with the exception of Northern Europeans who earn 
significantly more, and Eastern European men and Asians who earn about the same as 
natives (Algan et al. F19).  
 
(Algan et al. F17). 
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Viewed in terms of economics, this would mean that Northern Europeans are viewed as the 
most successful immigrant group and therefore the more accepted group, while Eastern 
European and Asians would be somewhat less accepted though still moderately successful as 
immigrants. Other immigrant groups are more likely to disgruntle and be rejected by the 
native French population. The lack of economic success by immigrant groups fuels 
stereotypes and prejudices against immigrants as people who will not work and are 
burdensome to French nationals.  
Employment and earnings are both signs of economic integration, but the region of 
origin, level of education, reason for migration, and gender are the factors that shape the 
immigrant labor market in France. Region of origin has already been discussed in terms of 
employment and earnings and appears to play a significant role in an immigrant’s economic 
life. However, level of education plays the second most important role in shaping the French 
immigrant labor market. Education is largely determined prior to labor market outcomes and 
is crucial in influencing these outcomes later in life. In “The Economic Situation of First and 
Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom” education is 
measured by the age left full time education. French men leave education around the average 
age of 18.3 years. Men from Africa, Northern Europe, and Eastern Europe are 19.3 or 20.3 
years older when leaving French education, while men from Southern Europe and Turkey are 
on average 15.3 and 15.2 years old when they leave school. Men from the Maghreb and Asia 
are about the same age as native Frenchmen when leaving French education (Algan et al. 
F13).  
Only women from Northern and Eastern Europe are at least as old as native French 
women when they leave full time education, and all other groups are significantly younger 
 Chobot 30 
 
than their French women and male immigrant counterparts (Algan et al. F13). Highly skilled 
immigrants also show better employment rates than immigrants of other education levels. 
This is because individuals with higher education have skills in high demand, thus holding a 
tertiary education diploma increases the likelihood of employment drastically. In nine years, 
starting in 2000, tertiary degree holding French natives experienced 5.4 percent 
unemployment and secondary educated natives experienced 7.9 percent. During the same 
time period, highly educated immigrant unemployment was 13.2 percent and secondary 
educated immigrant unemployment was 23 percent (Simon and Steichen 9). One common 
finding of studies on immigrants’ access to employment is that they are more likely to be 
overqualified for jobs. Some studies find that, over time, immigrants will find it easier to 
move out of low skilled work and find jobs matching their skill set and experience as they 
develop host-country capital, but others suggest that immigrants are prone to stagnation in 
low skilled work. Proportions of working immigrants in low-skilled jobs increases with time 
of residence. The increase is sharp for the first two years moving from fifteen to twenty and 
then to twenty-five percent, then it remains stable until the sixth year, after which it slowly 
decreases (Simon and Steichen 15). This indicates that it is not just lack of host-country 
capital or education that is preventing immigrants from entering high skilled employment and 
gaining fiscally. 
Another important factor for immigrant labor outcomes is the reason for migration. 
The majority of immigrants, forty-five to fifty-four percent depending on the years, arrive in 
France for family reunification, others enter as asylum seekers or for studies. The smallest 
portion, just seventeen to ten percent, migrate to France with an employment contract and 
enter directly into the French labor market (Simon and Steichen 4). The French government 
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suspended unskilled migration following the 1973 oil crisis resulting in a severe decrease in 
labor migration. Recently, the French government has attempted to increase labor migration 
and decrease non- labor migration with its immigration choisie policy. Policies, such as, Loi 
n° 2006-911 and Décret n° 2016-288 have been implemented to do just this. Loi n° 2006-911 
has four main objectives: recruiting skilled workers, facilitating foreign students’ stay, 
tightening the rules on family reunification, and limiting access to residence and citizenship. 
This law reflects France’s desire to change the main form of immigration from family 
reunification to labor driven. These policies have been far from successful. Between 2006 
and 2010, economic immigration rose from six percent to just nine percent, while family 
immigration declined from fifty-four percent to forty-four percent of total immigration 
(Simon and Steichen 3). If immigrants come to France to primarily re-unite with family, 
rather than join the labor force that can harm that immigrant groups overall ability to 
economically integrate into France.  
More recently we see Loi n° 2011-672 and Décret n° 2016-288. Loi n° 2011-672, 
initiated in 2011 that creates a temporary residence card to admit and allow greater mobility 
to highly qualified non-EU nationals with an employment contract of at least a year. The card 
can be issued up to three years and is renewable, however to renew this card the immigrant in 
question must have abided by the integration contract that they signed in order to settle in 
France long term. Décret n° 2016-288 introduces a Talent Passport residence permit for 
highly skilled workers and waives work permit requirements for them. The law also 
overhauls intracompany transfer routes for greater mobility within the European Union in 
France’s continuing fight to increase labor driven immigration. These laws exemplify 
France’s attempt at “immigration choisie,” attempting to pick immigrants that wish to come 
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to France for economic reasons by giving them special passports. Immigrants from within the 
EU receive, to an extent, special treatment. This makes sense because France is within in the 
EU trading bloc and subject to its rules and laws but it does put immigrants outside the EU at 
a greater disadvantage when trying to economically integrate.  
In the seventeen years since 2000, approximately two million immigrants from 
outside the European Union entered France on a permanent basis (Simon and Steichen 4). 
The early labor performance of these new immigrants was not particularly good. Many 
immigrants failed to enter the workforce within the first few years due to inability to find 
work, choosing not to look for work, or discouragement in their search. Those who arrived 
through marriage migration or family reunification were especially prone to labor inactivity. 
In fact, a 2006 Longitudinal Survey of the Trajectories and Profiles of Migrants found that 
economic inactivity was prevalent among sixty percent of immigrants who arrived as spouses 
of a French citizen and eighty-three percent of those who came through family reunification. 
Data from the Labor Force Survey analyzed in “Slow Motion: The Labor Market Integration 
of New Immigrants in France” confirmed that only fifty-two percent of immigrants arriving 
between 2003 and 2005 were active in the labor market and only forty-three percent of the 
2006 through 2008 cohort were active, one-third of both groups were unemployed and 
employment rates were thirty-five and thirty percent respectively (Simon and Steichen 6). 
Participation in the labor market increases overtime and the 2000 to 2002 group of 
immigrants’ participation rate almost caught up with the native population after nine years in 
France (Simon and Steichen 6).  Employment rates also improve over time although 
immigrants fail to catch up with natives and unemployment is persistent. In both the 2003-
2005 group and the 2006-2008 group the unemployment rate exceeded thirty percent in the 
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first year of arrival, however unemployment decreases dramatically during the next five 
years (Simon and Steichen 7). Those who arrive through family unification or marriage 
migration are particularly likely to be inactive a year after arrival but their activity rates show 
the greatest gains over time, indicating a small type of integration into France.  
The final factor that plays a role in labor market outcome is gender. Women tend to 
display lower employment rates more due to inactivity rather than unemployment. This is in 
part because the family structure, marriage, the number and age of children, play an 
important part in their economic activity. Men have greater employment stability than 
women and are more likely to be employed than women, seventy-one percent versus forty 
percent, and are more likely to remain employed the next year, eighty-seven percent 
compared to seventy-nine (Simon and Steichen 11). However, men are more likely to 
become unemployed while women are more likely to become inactive. The gender gap even 
persists over time, because after nine years the it is around twenty-five percent while the gap 
among natives declined from eleven percent to nine percent between 2003 and 2012 (Simon 
and Steichen 12). Gender inequalities are extreme as women are not only more concentrated 
in low-skilled jobs when they arrive but this concentration increases over time, while the 
percent of newly arrived immigrant men in low-skilled work remains stable after the first 
year (Simon and Steichen 15). Women make up a significant part of the potential immigrant 
workforce and their lack of activity in the labor market tends to bring down overall averages.  
 
Religion and Economic Integration 
Region of origin, level of education, reason for immigration, and gender determines 
the economic abilities of each immigrant group. However, religion plays a role in limiting or 
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widening of the pool of jobs available to an immigrant in France. Testing of job applications 
or housing applications with a CV including different individual characteristics such as name 
and volunteer work, social scientists have demonstrated the existence of discrimination based 
on presumed names, national origin, residence or photos of the tested individual. “Integration 
into Europe: Identifying a Muslim Effect” conducts a study focusing on the comparative 
success of Muslim immigrants and their descendants in the French speaking labor market and 
asks the question “do French Muslims suffer in economic integration in France in ways that 
would not be so if everything about were the same, but they were not Muslim” (4).  
This study consists of a CV experiment which means sending letters from fictitious 
applicants in response to job advertisements and analyzing the response rate of these 
applications. To make sure region of origin was not a factor two of the women were given an 
obviously Senegalese last name, Diouf, but one of whom had the well-known Muslim first 
name of Khadija while the other had the well-known Catholic first name of Marie. The third 
CV was from a woman with a typical French name and minimal religious connotations, 
Aurélie Ménard. All three applicants had two years of post-secondary education, were 
unmarried, and had three years of experience on the job market to reflect experience in the 
advertised job sector. Religious identification was reinforced when one of Khadija’s past 
positions was with “Secours Islamique”; one of Marie’s was with “Secours Catholique” 
while Aurélie worked only with secular firms. Khadija also did voluntary work for the Scouts 
Musulmans de France, while Marie did the same for Scouts et Guides de France, the 
comparable Catholic organization (Adida et al. 9). The results put Aurélie as the consistent 
favorite but more remarkably so when put against Khadidja. Marie and Khadidja fared 
significantly differently with Marie receiving call backs twenty-one percent of the time 
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compared to eight percent for Kahdija, both in competition with Auréilie, who did two and a 
half times better than both the Diouf applications (Adida et al. 9).  
Given that 89.13% of the Maghreb population is Muslim and 98.30% of Turkey 
practices Islam and the job discrimination that results from being outwardly religious, it 
makes sense that immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey would be so much less able to 
economically integrate than their counterparts form other regions (North Africa, Turkey). 
The outlier is the immigrant group from Sub-Saharan Africa. This group ranks consistently 
with immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey and yet is 82.38% Christian and just 1.53% 
Muslim, which means they should face significantly less job discrimination (Southern 
Africa). That is until it is taken into account that immigrants from this area are most likely to 
come from former French colonies such as Mali, Senegal and Niger, which have large 
Muslim populations at 90%, 94%, and 95% respectively, and that individuals with presumed 
characteristics of someone originating from North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa are five 
times less likely than a presumed white person to receive a positive response on job or 
housing applications (Muslim Population & Des Neiges Léonard 78). This test and others 
like it suggests a strong link between job discrimination and economic returns, and thus 
economic acceptance and integration, for Muslim immigrants in France. 
 
The Second Generation 
To determine long term labor market outcomes for each immigrant group education 
and labor market integration in terms of employment and earnings will be examined. While 
employment and earnings are the main focus of this discussion, education will also be 
analyzed largely because it is determined prior to entry into the labor market and can be 
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controlled to a certain extent unlike gender and parental region of origin. Education in the 
French school system rather than the parental country’s school system should affect the 
employment and earning capabilities of the second generation.  
Algan et al. find that from the first to the second generation, the educational 
attainment gap narrows for most immigrant groups, and that includes those who did initially 
better and those who did initially worse. For example, the negative gaps for Southern 
European me decreased from 3.3 years to 0.7 years and from 3.2 years to 0.4 years for 
Turkish men (Algan et al.  F13). However, there is also an improvement from the first to the 
second generation among the most disadvantaged groups of the first generation, in 
educational attainment. Second generation Asian women had a 2.6-year edge of educational 
attainment relative to native French women (Algan et al. F13).  The Economic Situation of 
First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom” 
concluded that any education gaps that exist for the first generation are generally being 
narrowed for the second so that education systems are not reinforcing inequalities that exist 
between natives and first-generation immigrants 
Brinbuam et al., authors of “The Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence 
of a Second Generation” however, find that inequalities between natives and first-generation 
immigrants are carried into the second generation. In fact, Brinbaume et al. sites  
A large body of research has established that children of immigrants are at a 
disadvantage compared with native French children (Richard 2004; Brinbaum and 
Werquin 1997,1999; Canaméro et al. 2000; Dupray and Moullet 2004; Frickey et al 
2004; Meurs et al. 2006; Silberman and Fournier 199,20006). The results of these 
studies are consistent with may qualitative observations that identify mechanisms of 
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discrimination in access to training courses, public service assistance in job searches 
and the private sector labor market… While differences in educational success are 
explained largely by social origin and parental educational attainment, this is not true 
in the labor market, where differential results among groups must in part be attributed 
to the effects of discrimination. (34) 
This study finds that second generation immigrant youth are more likely to be outside the 
French educational system. This is in part due to difficulties involving the French language. 
A 1992 geographic mobility and social integration survey found that only twenty percent of 
all immigrants used their native language exclusively rose with their children, although 
nearly all young people with two immigrant parents understood the native language of their 
parents (Brinbaum et al. 22). Many families communicate on two levels; the parents 
communicate in the native tongue while the children speak French. The tendency to maintain 
use of the native language or to use French varies considerably according to country of 
origin, age at arrival in France and gender (Brinbaum et al. 23) Despite many children of 
immigrants speaking French among themselves, they face barriers because it is not their first 
language. New arrivals face many obstacles during the enrollment in the regular school 
system, because student’s difficulties in French are often considered intellectual 
shortcomings or that they have limited potential for academic success, non-native French 
speakers are often placed into classes with low achievers or students with special needs 
(Brinbaum et al. 28). There is an emphasis on proficiency in French that is detriment to other 
educational attainments. Additionally, loi n° 94-665, that mandates the use of French 
language all workplaces and any form of commercial communication activity. Taking into 
account the reduced educational attainments that result from being placed in remedial classes 
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due to difficulty with the French language and being required to use French in the workplace 
and with work documents immigrant’s children are two times more likely to leave secondary 
education with no qualifications than their French counterparts (Brinbaum et al. 29, 31).“The 
Children of Immigrants in France: The Emergence of a Second Generation” also finds that 
second generation immigrant youth experience between 1.5 and 2.0 times more 
unemployment than their native peers (35). Labor force participation rate also varies between 
young French men and women and their second-generation immigrant peers at 48.4 percent 
to 40.4 percent and 41.2 percent to 34.5 percent respectively (Brinbaum et al. 33). This can 
be contributed, in part, to the quality of education received by each group, but also to the 
region of origin of each group, as well as the gender of each individual. It is true that the 
educational attainment increases from the first-generation to the second-generation 
immigrant group as stated by Algan et al. but that does not mean that the inequalities that 
existed between the first generation and the native group are not reinforced. Inequalities 
faced by the first generation are reinforced as the second generation attempts to integrate into 
the labor market.  
Employment gaps between immigrant groups and natives in France are large. For 
people in immigrant groups from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey, the employment gap 
widens from the first generation to the second generation. Second-generation men in in the 
immigrant groups from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey can expect to face 26.7 percentage 
points, 47.9 percentage points, and 41.6 percentage point gaps in terms of employment 
compared to native men, thus facing significantly higher unemployment (Algan et al. F24). 
Women from these same groups face even larger gaps from the first generation to the second. 
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Most other groups manage to successfully close the employment gap to comparable natives 
from one generation to the next.  
Earnings is the second indicator of economic integration of each immigrant group, 
because how much a group earns demonstrates how much they fiscally contribute to France. 
The more a group earns the more they contribute, and the more accepted they are into French 
society. Second-generation men from the Maghreb find that their wage gap decreases from 
the first generations by 0.097 log points, while it remains constant for immigrants from 
Africa and actually increases around 0.173 log points for immigrants from Turkey (Algan et 
al. F19). This does not necessarily mean that second generation Turks earn less than first 
generation Turks, because second-generation Turks do have better education. However, 
compared to natives with the same educational attainment, second-generation Turks do earn 
less (Algan et al. 19). The second generation from the immigrant groups of men from 
Southern Europe and women from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Asia improve earnings 
significantly. The other second generation immigrant groups improve earnings modestly 
from generation to generation.  
Using earnings and employment as signs of economic integration, second generation 
immigrants from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey show less integration than their Asian and 
European counterparts. This means the former immigrant groups have lower net economic 
and fiscal contribution than the later immigrant groups. Immigrants from the Maghreb, 
Africa, and Turkey poor economic successes, even a generation after immigration, has led to 
social unrest and economic exclusion of these groups. Immigration policy in France is less 
favorable to these immigrant groups because of their inability to economically immigrate for 
one reason or another. 
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Conclusion 
The level of successful economic integration of immigrant groups in terms of 
employment and earnings greatly contributes to how accepted each group will be by French 
natives. The more employed and higher earning groups such as Northern, Eastern, and 
Southern Europeans, and Asians are much more easily accepted by the native French 
population as immigrants, because in the first and second generation they have similar 
employment and earning levels as those of comparable French natives. Meanwhile, 
immigrants from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey are not as employed and earn much less 
than their comparable French counterparts from generation to generation. This means that 
ultimately these groups contribute less economically and fiscally to the host country and are 
not considered desirable as immigrants. However, there may be a secondary reason as to why 
these three groups have so much difficulty integrating economically: religion.  
People with Muslim identifiers are inordinately more likely to have a difficult time 
finding a job. Given this it makes sense that immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey are so 
much less able to integrate economically. Religion explains these two groups economic 
difficulties but not Sub-Saharan Africans difficulties, because Sub-Saharan Africans are 
majority Christians. That is until it is taken into account that individuals with presumed 
characteristics of someone originating from North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa are five 
times less likely than a presumed white person to receive a positive response on job or 
housing applications (qtd. in Des Nieges Léonard 78). Economic integration is a strong factor 
in whether an immigrant group will be accepted or not and religion and skin color plays a 
strong factor in a group’s ability to integrate in this manner. French ideas of assimilation and 
what “French” looks like extends into the economic sphere and determines acceptance of 
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immigrant groups. Because immigrants from the Maghreb, Turkey, and Sub-Saharan Africa 
cannot change their skin color and are highly reluctant to change their religion they are at a 
much greater disadvantage than other immigrant groups. They are also easily identifiable as a 
target of anti-immigrant sentiment, which would explain why when the French media and 
politicians speak of immigrants a brown skinned, Muslim is whom they are referring to 
rather than a Polish, white person. Social unrest is rife when discussing these three groups 
and lack of economic integration due to a variety of reasons, but none more so than religion, 
is why. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Current French attitudes and policies towards acceptance of immigrants have a base 
that goes back to the beginning of the French Colonial Empire. From then to now, 
immigrants that were too outwardly different from the native French population, whether that 
be due to race or cultural markers, were always less accepted and more reviled than other 
immigrants. Attitudes and policies also became kinder or harsher depending on whether or 
not France was in an economic boom or an economic crisis. Following economic booms and 
busts was the ebb and flow of nationalism and xenophobia.  Recent terrorist attacks by 
immigrants in France have also resulted in a more xenophobic atmosphere, however, France 
produced the environment that allowed extremism to flourish.  
 In chapter one the legal requirements to become a French citizen are examined and 
found to reflect France’s passion for assimilation policy. When three out of the seven 
requirements show a need for a new citizen to be culturally French in some way or another. 
France also has a long-held tradition of cultural citizenship, that rejects any and all other 
types of public culture that is not French. This is also seen in how reviled the term 
communautarisme, multiculturalism is. To be a supporter of communautarisme is to go 
against the values and culture of the Republic. Additionally, recent economic crises the EU 
has faced has contributed to the rise of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment in France, 
making it that much more difficult for immigrants to gain acceptance.  
 In chapter two the economic integration of different immigrant groups is analyzed in 
the short and long term. It is discovered that immigrants from the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Turkey are the least able to economically integrate in the long and short term. As 
a result, economic exclusion in terms of laws, and social unrest regarding immigrants from 
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these areas is prevalent. It also does not help that many immigrants from these areas are 
Muslim and thus visibly different than the native French population which hinders 
acceptance of these groups.  
France is balancing on the edge of a knife regarding its future as a global player. 
During the May 2017 presidential elections and June 2017 legislative elections, the French 
population will pick a side and jump. Parties that promote crackdowns on immigration and 
globalization are highly popular for this election cycle. National Front presidential candidate 
Marie Le Pen is much in favor with the French population at the moment because her party’s 
rhetoric is in line with popular ideas. Indeed, Le Pen is leading national opinion polls as of 
March 24, 2017, according to the Financial Times. In French, presidential elections, unless a 
candidate wins an unprecedented fifty percent of the popular vote during the first round, the 
two leading candidates go into a run-off. French pollsters are focusing on three candidates. 
Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron, a socially liberal centrist, and François Fillon, a center-right 
conservative. The run-off will currently result in two scenarios: Le Pen vs. Macron, or Le 
Pen vs. Fillon (Locke et al.).  
Related to the French election is Brexit. Brexit occurred June 23, 2016, and Britain 
voted to leave the European Union for good. Why did this happen: A distrust of the European 
Union, a suspicion that Great Britain was getting the short straw when it came to deals made 
within the trading bloc, and a view of immigration that gained hues of Islamophobia as 
migrants surged from Middle Eastern conflicts to Britain. These three factors were the 
primary reason Britain voted to part with the European Union. These are also three factors 
that we see in play as debates rage between French candidates for political offices. Popular 
rhetoric in these debates insists that France is getting a raw deal with trade agreements in the 
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EU and that immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, are ruining everything for France. 
This raises the question of a potential Frexit.  
Given the top two scenarios, Le Pen vs. Macron and Le Pen vs. Fillon, and anti-
globalization and anti-immigrant sentiment found in France’s political atmosphere that was 
also found during the Brexit vote, I think that France will leave the EU within in the next five 
years if either Le Pen or Fillon is elected. If it comes down to a Le Pen vs Marion run-off I 
believe Le Pen will win due to the protectionist platform she espouses and the rising 
nationalism in France today.  
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